Preventing disaster

An early policy research project on how flood-control infrastructure, land policy, and speculative development increased New Orleans’ exposure to catastrophic risk.

In 2009, I wrote Preventing Disaster: A Georgist Perspective on Flood Control in New Orleans as my senior thesis at Bard College. The paper began with a question that remained unresolved after Hurricane Katrina:

How did decades of public investment in flood protection produce a city that was still so vulnerable to catastrophic flooding?

The standard explanation focused on failed levees, weak engineering, and poor emergency response. Those failures mattered, but I argued that they were symptoms of a deeper problem. New Orleans’ flood risk had been shaped by land policy. Publicly financed flood-control infrastructure increased the value of low-lying land, encouraged speculative development, and shifted the cost of protection from landowners to the general taxpayer. The result was a system that repeatedly expanded development into areas that were expensive to protect and dangerous to occupy.

The argument

The paper’s central claim was that flood-control policy should be understood through land values. Levees, drainage systems, spillways, and pumping infrastructure do more than reduce flood risk. They also increase the value of the land they protect. That creates a basic policy question:

Who receives the benefit, and who pays the cost?

In New Orleans, the answer was often misaligned. Private landowners captured much of the increase in land value created by public infrastructure, while taxpayers absorbed the cost of building and maintaining the system. This encouraged development in places where the social cost of protection may have exceeded the value of the land itself. The paper argued that this structure created three recurring problems:

  • Flood-control investments encouraged development in hazardous areas.
  • Political pressure favored visible projects that increased land values quickly.
  • The public repeatedly subsidized private speculative gains.

This turned flood control into a form of land development policy, even when government agencies did not describe it that way.

Looking beyond engineering failure

The physical failure of levees during Katrina was real, but focusing only on engineering obscures the broader system. The city’s vulnerability had been built over decades. After Hurricane Betsy in 1965, the federal government launched a major hurricane-protection program. New levees and drainage infrastructure opened large areas of low-lying wetlands to development. The metropolitan footprint expanded even as the city’s population declined. The system therefore produced a dangerous cycle:

More flood protection enabled more development, and more development created political pressure for additional flood protection.

By the time Katrina arrived, much more property and many more people were exposed than had been the case forty years earlier. The disaster was not simply the result of one failed wall. It was the consequence of a long-running incentive structure.

Historical research

The project traced New Orleans’ relationship with land and flood control from the colonial period through the twentieth century. It examined:

  • French and English traditions of land ownership
  • Early conflicts over common and private property
  • The failure of fragmented local levee systems
  • The emergence of federal flood-control authority
  • The Army Corps of Engineers’ “levees-only” approach
  • Congressional incentives and landowner influence
  • The expansion of development into low-lying areas after 1965
  • The role of cost-benefit analysis in justifying federally subsidized projects

The history showed that coordination failures were not new. For much of the nineteenth century, landowners built and maintained levees independently. One weak section could endanger the entire floodplain, but no single landowner had an incentive to pay for the whole system. Federal intervention eventually solved part of that coordination problem, but created another: the agencies making investment decisions were not the same groups bearing the full cost.

The result was not underinvestment alone. It was also investment in the wrong places.

A land-value-based alternative

The paper proposed land value taxation as a way to realign incentives. The basic principle was straightforward:

Land that benefits from flood protection should bear the cost of that protection.

Under this approach, the public would recover more of the value created by levees and other infrastructure. Landowners would have less incentive to lobby for protection of marginal land because they would bear more of the cost. Flood-control districts would also face stronger pressure to distinguish between land worth protecting and land whose protection costs exceeded its value.

I argued that New Orleans should:

  • Increase taxes on land values
  • Reduce taxes on buildings and productive investment
  • Finance structural flood protection through land-value-based revenue
  • Strengthen land-use controls, building standards, and risk communication
  • Reduce subsidies for development in the most hazardous areas

The objective was not simply to raise revenue. It was to change behavior. A land-value-based system could encourage a more compact city, reduce speculative development in dangerous areas, and better align public investment with actual social benefit.

What the maps showed

The project used historical maps and satellite imagery to connect policy decisions to physical development.

The visuals showed:

  • The difference between French and English land-allocation patterns along the Mississippi
  • The concentration of early development on higher ground near the river
  • The later expansion of New Orleans into wetlands and low-lying areas
  • The geography of levees, drainage canals, pumping stations, and spillways
  • A hypothetical flood-protection footprint that would have excluded some of the most hazardous land

These maps were important because the argument was geographic.

New Orleans’ flood risk was not distributed randomly. It reflected a long history of decisions about which land would be protected, developed, subsidized, and occupied.

Why this work still matters

The paper was written as an undergraduate thesis, but the core question has stayed with me:

How do public systems create incentives that produce the very failures they are meant to prevent?

That question later shaped my work in property taxation, public-sector data, product strategy, and institutional reform. Several themes in the paper became recurring themes in my career:

  • Public infrastructure redistributes value.
  • Technical systems embed policy choices.
  • Institutional incentives matter as much as formal rules.
  • Government failures are often structural, not merely operational.
  • Transparency is necessary to understand who benefits and who pays.
  • Better systems require changing incentives, not only improving execution.

The paper also reflects an early interest in problems that sit between disciplines. Flood control is simultaneously an engineering, economic, political, fiscal, and land-use problem. Treating it as only one of those things produces incomplete solutions.

What I would change today

The paper is ambitious and occasionally overstates its case. Today, I would be more careful about separating the contribution of land policy from other causes of Katrina’s destruction. Engineering failure, racial inequality, wetlands loss, emergency management, and governance all played major roles. I would also subject the land-value-tax proposal to more empirical testing before presenting it as the primary solution. But I still believe the paper’s central insight holds:

Public flood-control investments do not merely reduce risk. They change land values, development patterns, and political incentives.

Any serious flood policy has to account for those effects.

Read the original paper

Download Preventing Disaster: A Georgist Perspective on Flood Control in New Orleans