Rebuilding Property Assessments in Cook County
The problem
In Illinois, property assessments determine how a community’s property-tax burden is divided. When assessments are wrong, governments do not simply collect the wrong amount of revenue; they collect it from the wrong people. For years, Cook County systematically overassessed lower-priced homes while underassessing more expensive properties. Owners of modest homes therefore paid more than their fair share, while owners of higher-value properties received an unintended tax advantage. The problem was technical, institutional, and political.
The Assessor’s Office relied on outdated valuation methods, maintained poor underlying property data, disclosed little about how assessments were produced, and operated within a political system closely connected to the property-tax appeals industry. The Chicago Tribune and ProPublica documented these failures in The Tax Divide, an investigation that helped make property assessment a central issue in the 2018 election for Cook County Assessor.
From research to reform
In 2016, while I was a graduate student at the University of Chicago, I began working with Professor Chris Berry and Chicago Tribune reporter Jason Grotto to analyze Cook County’s residential assessment system. My paper, The Impact of Property Tax Appeals on Vertical Equity in Cook County, Illinois, became the basis for Part II of the three-part Tax Divide investigation: “The Problem with Appeals.” The finding was straightforward. Cook County’s assessment system was already regressive: lower-priced homes were assessed at higher rates than more expensive homes. The appeals process did not correct that inequity. It made it worse: Owners of more expensive properties were more likely to appeal, more likely to hire attorneys, and more likely to receive larger reductions. The result was a further shift of the tax burden onto homeowners with less valuable properties.
Building a new capability
Fritz Kaegi defeated incumbent Assessor Joseph Berrios in the March 2018 Democratic primary after campaigning on assessment fairness, transparency, and institutional reform. During the transition, I proposed creating a dedicated data science function inside the Assessor’s Office. I joined the administration in late 2018 as the office’s inaugural Chief Data Officer. The task was larger than developing a better predictive model. Cook County needed the internal ability to build, operate, evaluate, explain, and continuously improve a modern assessment system.
Working with a broader team, I helped:
- establish the Assessor’s Office’s first dedicated data science team;
- develop a new automated residential valuation system;
- introduce modern model evaluation and quality-control practices;
- publish valuation code, methodology, and large public datasets;
- create reporting tools for measuring assessment accuracy and fairness;
- establish new transparency policies;
- and build public tools for understanding assessments and estimating property taxes.
In April 2019, we published the residential valuation code. Taxpayers, researchers, journalists, and outside experts could inspect the methods used to value homes rather than being asked to trust an unexplained result. That decision mattered as much as the model itself. Public algorithms should be open to public scrutiny, particularly when they help distribute billions of dollars in tax obligations.
What changed
In 2025, Christopher Berry independently evaluated residential assessments produced during the first six years of the Kaegi administration. He found that Cook County had made substantial progress. Under the previous administration, homes in the lowest five percent of sale prices were assessed at roughly 125 percent of their sale prices, while homes in the highest five percent were assessed at approximately 82 percent. Under the new administration, the difference between low- and high-priced homes narrowed substantially.
Berry concluded that:
- residential assessment regressivity had been dramatically reduced;
- Cook County had moved within accepted industry standards for vertical equity;
- tax shifting away from expensive homes and onto middle- and lower-priced homes had been nearly eliminated;
- and overtaxation of homes in the bottom 70 percent of the price distribution was approximately $1.9 billion lower than under the previous system.
The results did not mean that every assessment was correct or that every homeowner’s tax bill declined. Assessments distribute the tax burden; local governments separately determine how much revenue to collect. Rising levies can therefore produce rising tax bills even when assessments become fairer.The evaluation also found continuing problems. Residential properties remained underassessed on average, underlying data quality continued to limit model accuracy, and reductions granted through commercial appeals shifted substantial value back onto homeowners.
Reform improved the system. It did not finish the work.
What I learned
This project changed how I think about public-sector data work. A technically better model is necessary, but it is not sufficient. Sustainable reform requires an organization that can maintain the model, improve the underlying data, measure performance, explain decisions, and withstand political pressure. Transparency also cannot be added after the technical work is complete. It must be part of the system’s architecture. Publishing code, data, methods, and performance measures creates external accountability and allows knowledgeable outsiders to identify weaknesses that an internal team may miss.
I also learned that moving quickly creates its own risks. Some decisions were made before the organization had developed enough institutional support or operational discipline to execute them well. Our countywide COVID-19 valuation adjustments are one example. The intent was reasonable, but the approach was more speculative than the evidence justified.
The strongest public institutions combine technical ambition with operational restraint.
The larger lesson
Cook County demonstrated that a deeply entrenched public system could change. The reform required investigative journalism, academic research, electoral accountability, political leadership, technical expertise, open-source development, and the work of career public servants. No single model or individual produced the result. My role was to help convert a public diagnosis into an operating institution: a team, a technical system, a set of public tools, and an expectation that government should be able to explain how consequential decisions are made.
That remains the standard I apply to public-sector data work today.
Sources
- Ross, Robert. “The Impact of Property Tax Appeals on Vertical Equity in Cook County, IL.” Center for Municipal Finance, University of Chicago, June 2017.
- The Tax Divide — ProPublica and the Chicago Tribune
- How Cook County’s Democratic Machine Works — The Economist
- An Evaluation of Progress on Residential Assessment Fairness in Cook County — Christopher Berry
- How I tried to fix residential assessments in Chicago